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The debate on TPP versus RCEP has been widely recognized as a struggle between the 
United States and China for expanding their influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and it 
is now commonplace for scholars to discuss the rivalry between the two agreements.1 
Both the TPP and RCEP agreements could invigorate the sluggish Asia-Pacific economy 
by promoting trade liberalization and economic integration; however, the story is not so 
simple because they have been recognized as being a political tool as well as economic 
drivers. An important change occurred on March 15, 2013 when Prime Minister Abe Shinzo 
announced that Japan would formally seek to join the negotiations to establish TPP, in 
which the United States leads. Japan became the 12th member of the negotiations at the 
18th round on July 2013 and now leads the TPP negotiations with the United States. From 
its perspective, Japan’s participation in TPP might be the best option for revitalizing its 
economy and restoring its growth.2 At the same time, it caused the equilibrium between the 
competing TPP and RCEP to shift toward TPP.
TPP aims to be a 21st century trade agreement that sets the rules for trade and investment 
in the Asia-Pacific region going forward. Achieving this goal will require other major 
economies in the region to join TPP with the intention of ultimately becoming a FTA 
of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Japan’s participation in TPP will give added momentum 
towards this goal. As the second largest economy in Asia and the third largest economy 
in the world, Japan’s participation would be pivotal to enhancing the credibility and 
viability of TPP as a regional FTA. With Japan, TPP covers roughly 40 percent of global 
GDP as compared to 30 percent by RCEP countries. Furthermore, Japan’s entry into 
the TPP talks gave further impetus to other countries. Korea expressed its interest in 
joining the ongoing negotiations for TPP late last year. The Philippines and Thailand are 
watching the TPP negotiations with an eye to joining. The TPP with Japan creates the 
impetus for China, Korea, and ASEAN to reconsider Asia-Pacific economic regionalism 
and to modify their regional integration.
ASEAN is on the ropes and will again worry about the possibility of marginalization in the 
process of Asian economic integration. The sudden rise of RCEP is, in fact, closely related 
to the rise of the U.S.-led TPP, including the China, Japan, and Korea (CJK) FTA. ASEAN, a 
group comprised of relatively small countries, entered into the ASEAN FTA (AFTA) in 1992 
and began a step-by-step liberalization of trade. RCEP has built an ASEAN+1 FTA network 
throughout greater Asia with ASEAN occupying the pivotal position. Most likely ASEAN 
was able to take the helm of the region because RCEP was put forward in an effort to avoid 
conflict and rivalry between China and Japan and because stable economic growth makes it 
an attractive candidate.
From 2010, however, ASEAN was worried that the U.S.-led TPP could weaken ties in ASEAN 
and might marginalize the association. Four of the ASEAN 10 (Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, 
and Malaysia) have already joined the TPP talks, causing concern that the association could 
split into two: TPP-ASEAN and non-TPP ASEAN. The option of ASEAN joining the TPP 
as a region would be possible, but those countries whose level of development are lagging, 
such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, could not accept high-quality market access with 
few exemptions and extensive regulatory alignment that TPP pursues.
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From 2011, TPP was the leading trade policy initiative of the Obama administration. As a 
core component of efforts to rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, TPP negotiations 
were accelerated. ASEAN also hastened RCEP negotiations with the goal of consolidating 
the internal solidarity of the association. At first, China was wary of RCEP, taking a strong 
stance in favor of economic integration only within East Asia,3 while seeking to prevent 
direct conflict with the United States by having ASEAN take the lead. Subsequently, China 
sought to help ASEAN accelerate the progress of RCEP with broader scope, but not with 
the United States. Since Japan showed strong leanings towards TPP from that time, China 
shared ASEAN’s concerns about a centrifugal force arising to split asunder the economic 
integration of East Asia. In addition to the U.S.-led TPP, the fact that preparations are 
underway for negotiations for a CJK FTA has caused ASEAN to move up its proposal for 
forming RCEP. Because of such concern, ASEAN has more vigorously promoted RCEP in 
an effort to maintain its centrality in regional economic integration by not falling behind 
the momentum elsewhere.
ASEAN’s efforts have apparently largely been for naught. The TPP alliance was expanded 
and even strengthened by Japan’s participation. The CJK FTA negotiations, which remained 
elusive until the end of 2012, were launched and even finished their third formal meeting in 
November 2013. Now there is doubt that ASEAN will preserve its centrality by shepherding 
RCEP to a successful conclusion. Taking into account these new circumstances, it is time for 
ASEAN to search for ways to preserve its centrality in economic integration and to discuss 
its troubles frankly with large economies in the region as well as ASEAN member countries.
China is presumably much less comfortable with Japan’s participation in TPP, which it 
has regarded as the U.S. effort to encircle it. It is obvious that the current TPP contains 
many provisions that China would find unacceptable, at least in the near future, such as 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) regulations and increased intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection. Although China’s attitude towards TPP has softened in recent months, with some 
officials and analysts recently arguing that China should participate, this is unlikely in the 
near future. Therefore, China has responded by forging ahead with RCEP and its own FTA 
negotiations, including the CJK FTA. Development of RCEP could receive strong backing 
from both China and ASEAN; however, prospects for the CJK FTA have turned darker.
The CJK FTA definitely has large benefits for the three Northeast Asian countries and 
significant implications for global multilateral trade. It can also be regarded as a stepping-
stone for successful conclusion of RCEP negotiations; however, there are significant hurdles 
that make its expeditious completion or even bilateral FTAs between Japan and China or 
between Japan and Korea extremely difficult. In particular, historical issues and unsettled 
territorial disputes continue to cause uncertainty in the future of CJK FTA negotiations.4
Korea has dealt with the delicate balance between the United States and China. It signed the 
KORUS FTA and is now negotiating a bilateral FTA with China. Moreover, Korea is playing 
a major role in RCEP negotiations. With the KORUS FTA, and agreements with other TPP 
partners (Australia, Canada, Chile, Peru, Singapore, and ASEAN) already in place,5 Korea 
was confident that it could join TPP at a later date. However, Japan’s recent entry changes 
its calculus. Entry into TPP would give Japan a stronger bargaining position in its other 
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outstanding trade negotiations, such as RCEP and the accord with China and South Korea. 
In fact, Japan is becoming a linchpin in the overall process of region-wide FTA formations, 
which Korea had hoped to become after the KORUS FTA.
In summation, in regional context, there appears to be an economic and geopolitical contest 
between TPP and RCEP. The CJK FTA is also inextricably connected to the region’s strategic 
environment and the alternative FTAs of TPP and RCEP. With those complicated competing 
negotiations being pressed by the United States, China, Japan, and ASEAN, how these 
agreements evolve over time will greatly affect the structure of the Asia-Pacific economy 
in the years ahead, and even the political relationship between the United States and China. 
Because of Korea’s wide-ranging FTA networks, its decisions on economic regionalism will 
be an important signal of its vision for the future of Asia and the leadership it can exert. This 
chapter examines its options and the various strategies that Korea could employ to balance 
the pressures from China and the United States, while gaining the most economic benefit 
from the potential regional integration. With this in mind, the following sections focus on 
Korean thinking about both TPP and RCEP in terms of global trade flows and geopolitical 
impact and consider Korean views of what is the right balance in Asia-Pacific economic 
regionalism between the two great powers.
Korea’s Views on TPP and RCEP
TPP and Korea
(1) TPP as a New Global Standard for Future International Trade. TPP clearly has potential 
to be a new global standard for international trade. With 29 chapters under negotiation, TPP 
partners seek new disciplines on certain activities not heretofore addressed in both FTAs and 
the WTO. For example, TPP deals with new issues such as regulatory coherence, supply chain 
competitiveness, and small-and medium-sized enterprises. This is a major reason why TPP is 
called a 21st century regional FTA. If concluded as envisioned, it could serve as a template for 
a future global trade pact among WTO as well as APEC members.
Currently ranking as the 7th largest exporter and 12th largest economy in the world, Korea 
cannot help having great interest in the new rules and standards under negotiation by current 
TPP partners.6 TPP will seriously affect Korea’s exports to 12 TPP member countries as well 
as to non-TPP countries. Furthermore, TPP could influence the shape of Korea’s trade policy 
for the foreseeable future. Korea has a strong incentive to participate in the TPP negotiations 
as soon as possible in order to put its own interests into the rule-making process on 21st 
century new trade issues before the negotiations are finalized. Last December, Wendy Cutler, 
acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, said it would be very difficult for any country, 
including Korea, to join the ongoing TPP negotiations, noting that the TPP talks are already 
in the end game. However, given the substantive disagreements among TPP negotiators on 
market access, intellectual property protection, and state-owned enterprises, it is conceivable 
that the negotiations could extend into 2015.
Since Korea is already well prepared to embrace the rigorous standards of TPP, as they 
closely reflect provisions negotiated in the KORUS FTA and Korea-EU FTA, the adjustment 
costs of membership are estimated as not very onerous. For instance, the KORUS FTA goes 
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further than the WTO in a range of areas, including intellectual property rules, services, 
and non-tariff barriers such as standards. Additionally, it addresses so-called “WTO-plus” 
issues by including commitments in areas such as investment access and protection, trade 
facilitation, competition, and environmental and labor policy.
(2) TPP as a Mechanism for De Facto Isolation of China in East Asia. Korea’s entrance 
into TPP could cause serious imbalance in the two competing region-wide FTAs, as noted 
above. Although the TPP seeks to be a “living agreement”—meaning that other countries 
can join at any time and other areas of trade can be added to the agreement in the future—the 
high standards are thought to be too big a barrier for China to overcome in the foreseeable 
future. While TPP does not intend to marginalize China in East Asia, it is also true that the 
content of TPP is beyond China’s acceptance limit.
Chinese leaders recognize that a series of policy changes are needed if they are to sustain 
economic growth, ensure social stability, and restore the tarnished legitimacy of the 
communist party. However, they fully understand that rapid market reform is not a feasible 
pathway to this end. China cannot participate in TPP negotiations, at least in the near future, 
because it could result in both rapid and unsettling reform of its fundamental economic and 
social structure. Therefore, from China’s point of view, the “living agreement” idea can be 
seen as a purely rhetorical device. China may believe that Japan’s successful entry into the 
TPP negotiations means that the United States has taken a step forward in encircling it. In 
this situation, a decision by Korea to join TPP could be absolutely undesirable for China 
and could provoke a serious imbalance in two competing mega region-wide FTAs: TPP 
and RCEP. Already suffering from diminishing competitiveness, China is keen to avoid any 
further hits to its trade position, which it would view through the lens of geopolitics as well 
as economics. The impact could be dangerous for regional stability.
Table 1. TPP versus RCEP: GDP and Trade (Unit: Billion US Dollars, %)
TPP
RCEP
TPP11 TPP12 TPP13
GDP
22,824 27,831 29,029 20,983
(31.1) (37.9) (39.5) (28.6)
Trade
7,858 9,543 10,610 13,160
(21.2) (25.8) (28.7) (35.5)
Note: TPP11: Japan is excluded. TPP12: TPP11 + Japan. TPP13: TPP12 + Korea. The figure in 
parenthesis is both the GDP and trade share of each agreement, compared to world GDP and world 
trade. GDP is based on the 2013 data, and trade is based on 2012 data.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (October 2013); WTO, World Trade Statistics 2013
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China is the most important trading partner of Korea. The bilateral trade agreement with China 
covers a quarter of Korea’s exports. The trade surplus with China amounted to more than 
$53 billion in 2012, which is almost twice Korea’s total trade surplus, similarly calculated 
in 2013. In addition, China has influence on North Korea’s decision-making, which directly 
relates to the national security of South Korea. These significant factors cannot be ignored.
As a middle power in this region, Korea needs to pursue a balanced position in the process 
of Asia-Pacific economic integration, not only economically but also politically. In other 
words, Korea should prepare for entrance into the TPP negotiations but at the same time 
should guarantee that its participation in TPP is not harmful to the interests of China. 
Early conclusion of the bilateral FTA negotiations with China is one way to provide such 
reassurance. Exerting maximum effort for RCEP negotiations to make rapid progress is 
another. Both the bilateral FTA with China and RCEP could serve as a kind of insurance, 
preparing for the non-participation of Korea in TPP, should it be found that the cost of 
membership would be excessive.
(3) TPP as Requesting Expensive Entry Fees for Korea. Although the cost of TPP 
membership is estimated as not onerous, that estimation does not take into full account 
market access for goods. In its bilateral consultations with TPP partners, Korea may 
liberalize its sensitive items (e.g., rice or certain manufacturing sectors such as vehicles) 
further at the request of each of the current TPP countries.7 This could impose costs many 
are unwilling to bear. Korea has finished the first round of bilateral consultations with current 
TPP members. It is said that Korea took a strong defensive position over manufactured 
goods in the negotiations with Japan.8
Currently Korean farmers strongly oppose its participation in TPP because they 
recognize TPP to be the second KORUS FTA and the TPP pursues much more ambitious 
liberalization targets. They seem to believe that the United States could demand the 
full liberalization of the Korean rice market, which is excluded in the market access of 
KORUS FTA. Many manufacturing enterprises think that TPP is a de facto bilateral FTA 
with Japan and are deeply concerned that their enterprises would be adversely affected 
by Japanese competition. Thus, in return for entry into the TPP talks, Korea may have to 
pay a significant price such as full liberalization of the agricultural market or immediate 
Table 2. Korea’s Merchandise Trade with China (2012-13)
Total (A) With China (B) (B/A)
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
Export 547,870 559,649 134,323 145,837 0.245 0.261
Import 519,584 515,561 80,785 83,037 0.155 0.161
Balance 28,285 44,088 53,538 62,799 1.893 1.424
Source: KITA (Korea International Trade Association), Trade Statistics
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elimination of tariffs on Japanese vehicles.9 Such a big cost, although it may be smaller 
than the long-run gains, would be one of the major hurdles for Korea to enter into the 
gate of TPP. These domestic constraints have weighed heavily on the decision of whether 
to join TPP.
(4) Uncertain Expected Gains from TPP. Korea is expected to reap significant long-term 
benefits from joining TPP.10 Furthermore, the benefits of membership are manifold: greater 
bargaining power in ongoing negotiations with China and Japan to tackle non-tariff barriers, 
the rationalization of its FTA “noodle bowl” of multiple trade rules, and the consolidation 
of a forward-leaning alliance with the United States. However, there exist different views 
on how much Korea would really gain. First, the KORUS FTA and other separate free 
trade pacts with TPP countries will reduce the additional gains from the TPP pact. Second, 
although members have agreed to pursue a single set of TPP rules of origin, they are pursuing 
different approaches to developing a TPP tariff schedule. The United States has maintained 
that it was negotiating market access bilaterally and only with the TPP partners with which it 
did not have an FTA. Other participants have sought to negotiate plurilateral market access 
schedules. Thus, without firm harmonization of TPP rules of origin, the TPP may end up 
undermining the global trade system by adding more “noodles” to the bowl. Third, it is 
unclear exactly how TPP will address supply chains. China is, in fact, at the center of Asia’s 
trade growth and is a key link in global supply chains in Asia. The trade share of most Asian 
countries with China is higher than 10 percent. Even the U.S. import share from China is 
more than 19 percent. Therefore, the Asian supply chain without China would seem like an 
agreement with a big hole.
Table 3. Korea’s Merchandise Trade with Japan  
               (Unit: Billion US Dollars, %)
2000 2005 2010 2013
Total
Export 20.5 24.0 28.2 34.5
Import 31.8 48.4 64.3 60.0
Balance (A) -11.4 -24.4 -36.1 -25.3
Manufactured 
products
Export 18.6 22.6 26.3 32.7
Import 31.4 48.0 63.7 59.6
Balance (B) -12.8 -25.4 -37.4 -26.9
Machine & Vehicles
Export 8.4 8.4 9.5 10.3
Import 17.3 21.3 24.5 21.9
Balance (C) -8.9 -12.9 -15.0 -11.6
B/A 1.13 1.04 1.04 1.07
C/B 0.70 0.51 0.40 0.43
Source: KITA (Korea International Trade Association), Trade Statistics (www.kita.net)
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Petri, Plummer, and Zhai estimated that RCEP would yield income gains by the year 2025 
equivalent to 4.1 percent of GDP, which is almost two times higher than that of TPP.11 Some 
Korean scholars argue that Korea should be prioritizing the RCEP negotiations, including 
CJK trilateral FTA negotiations. Korea’s exports to the RCEP economies were $285 billion 
in 2013, which is more than 50 percent of its total exports.
Table 4. Merchandise Trade of Major Asia Pacific Countries with China  
               (Unit: %)
Export Share (to China) Import Share (from China)
Korea 26.1 16.1
Japan 18.1 21.7
ASEAN 11.4 14.8
Australia 29.5 18.2
New Zealand 15.0 16.4
India  5.0 11.0
United Sates  7.7 19.2
Note: The share is the percentage of exports (imports) going to (from) China to total exports 
(imports) of a country or region. Figures of ASEAN, Australia, New Zealand, and India are 2012 
statistics and other figures are 2013 statistics.
Source: KITA (Korea International Trade Association), Trade Statistics, MOF (Ministry of Finance), 
Trade Statistics of Japan, USDA, US Census Bureau, IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
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Figure 1. Korea’s Trade and Exports: Shares to Selected Trade Groupings  
    (2013)
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RCEP and Korea
(1) RCEP as a Strong Rival of TPP in Regional Integration in Asia. RCEP includes 
more than 3.4 billion people, has a combined GDP of about $21 trillion, and accounts for 
about 35 percent of world trade. If concluded successfully, RCEP would create the world’s 
largest trading bloc and has major implications for not only the Asian economy but also the 
world economy. In particular, it would be a powerful vehicle to support the spread of global 
production networks and reduce the inefficiencies of multiple Asian FTAs that exist presently.
It is often said that the RCEP is less ambitious than TPP, because of the “flexibility clause” 
built into its negotiating principles.12 However, flexibility is RCEP’s strength, allowing 
common objectives to be pursued over different paths and the interests of the less-developed 
members to be met. An important characteristic of Asian societies is their diversity. Cross-
cultural diversity adds to the exotic nature of Asia as a gigantic melting pot of diverse 
Figure 2. RCEP’s Share of the World: Population, GDP, and Trade  
    (unit %)
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cultures. Thus, flexibility is an essential factor for allowing Asian countries to integrate. 
Because of this, RCEP could be superior to TPP in regional economic integration.13 The level 
of market access in RCEP could be lower than that in TPP, but RCEP could embrace more 
economies. Thus, RCEP, if completed successfully, can be insurance to Korea and China, 
including other ASEAN states outside TPP.
(2) RCEP Needs Strong Leadership Based on ASEAN Centrality. Flexibility could be a 
benefit or a bane for RCEP. While it could help break deadlocks and find compromises among 
disparate national interests, it could also limit change or curtail progress in achieving greater 
liberalization. Unless there is enough political will to close potential loopholes disguised as 
“flexibility” and pursue reforms deeper than those ever before attempted, RCEP’s future as 
a consolidated bloc remains uncertain. Strong leadership is indispensable to concluding the 
negotiations successfully.
Leadership should be based on ASEAN centrality. China and Japan might not trust each 
other, but ASEAN is believed to be impartial. In fact, Japan has been searching for a way to 
manage the rise of China, largely through its relationship with the United States. ASEAN 
fears China’s military threat on the issue of the South China Sea, too. ASEAN knows that 
being too close to China or the United States is harmful to its unity. It can retain centrality by 
using the “ASEAN Way” of consultation and consensus to accommodate all the voices and 
needs of its members. In this respect, Korea should play the key role of regional mediator 
between China and ASEAN.
(3) RCEP as a Tool for Managing the Rise of China. ASEAN is concerned that China 
will eventually dominate East Asia through a China-led East Asia Community. Some 
countries, especially Myanmar and Vietnam, have actively engaged in strategic balancing 
between China and the United States. They seek more robust economic and strategic 
relationships with the United States to hedge against China’s threat. Thus, RCEP based 
on “ASEAN centrality” can be used to check the rise of China. ASEAN has long been 
considered neutral—it is not dominated by a great power. Fear of such domination may 
prompt ASEAN to strengthen itself and maintain unity, safeguard the consensus principle, 
and engage more carefully with regional powers.
Conclusion: Dual Track Approach
Initially a trade pact envisaged by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, TPP was 
transformed in 2008 when the United States expressed its interest. It has expanded to 12 
members. In particular, Japan’s entry into the negotiations brings a critical mass to a deal 
that, if completed, would cover countries that account for two-fifths of global output. The 
TPP agreement is ambitious in terms of not only its size, but also the scope and scale of its 
liberalization. If the United States also concluded a FTA agreement with the EU, it would 
have signed deals with countries accounting for two-thirds of global output. TPP, in other 
words, could be part of a grand strategy to conclude an only slightly less ambitious version 
of the Doha round by other means.
RCEP starts with flexibility in its guiding principles, allowing differential treatment for 
developing countries while still aiming for a high-standard agreement. While it would 
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expand ASEAN’s role in coordinating regional free trade negotiations, RCEP could help 
regionalize the sophisticated global production networks that make Asia the world’s factory. 
It would also reduce the overlap among Asian FTAs, lest Asia becomes a confusing “noodle 
bowl” of multiple trade rules.
TPP and RCEP may end up either providing ballast to the global trading system—and bringing 
some coherence to the many regional FTAs—or undermining it, by adding more “noodles” 
to the bowl. To achieve the first scenario, the agreements need to be complementary and 
outward looking, i.e., they should minimize discrimination towards non-members and be 
open to adding new members. The worst-case scenario is for these agreements to become 
competing, exclusive blocs with very little overlap in membership. It is already clear that it 
will be difficult for China to join TPP given the high hurdles to membership, and the U.S. 
Congress will not easily facilitate U.S. membership in RCEP.
Many analysts, noting the absence of China, regard TPP as a geopolitical club masquerading 
as a free-trade one. Until recently, some Chinese leaders described TPP as a plot designed to 
contain China’s rise. In this situation it is not easy for Korea to decide to join TPP; however, 
it does not want to be excluded in the rule-setting process for future global trade norms. 
This leads to a dual track approach. On the one hand, Korea pursues entry into TPP. On 
the other, it makes the utmost effort to conclude RCEP by 2015, based on the completion 
of a bilateral FTA with China. This is almost the same idea as that of a new FTA roadmap 
in June 2013, in which Korea plays the role of a linchpin between the integrated market of 
East Asia centered around China and the pan-Pacific market led by the United States. The 
synergy effects of acting as a “bridge” in these mega trade negotiations could be substantial. 
This could play out in three steps.
Step 1-A: Early Conclusion of the Korea-China FTA. This could be a crucial precondition 
for the successful conclusion of the RCEP talks as well as the CJK FTA negotiations. It 
would also strengthen Korea’s bargaining leverage when it starts to consult with existing 
TPP partners on joining the negotiations, while serving as a kind of insurance, preparing 
for non-participation in TPP, should the costs prove to be excessive. Since the KORUS 
FTA has already come into effect, the completion of Korea-China FTA talks has added 
significance for Korea.
Step 1-B: Start of Bilateral Consultations with TPP Members. Korea has already 
expressed its interest in joining TPP—its application for membership is really a matter of 
time. Then, the faster it joins TPP, the lower the entrance fees. At present it is proceeding 
with bilateral consultations with the current TPP countries simultaneously. A final decision 
on entry would be subject to the results of the bilateral consultations as well as the progress 
of the bilateral FTA negotiations with China. Korea has to keep open the possibility that it 
will not join TPP after all. If the entry costs are small enough for Korea to bear, then Korea 
should finish the China-Korea FTA negotiations quickly and, at the same time, enter into 
the TPP negotiations.
Step 2: Acceleration of the CJK FTA. This step is a natural result of step 1. In addition, the 
CJK FTA could be a stepping-stone to reach a successful conclusion in RCEP negotiations. 
Korea needs to accelerate the trilateral negotiations in a balanced manner. Agreement on 
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the Korea-China FTA could be a useful template for the CJK FTA talks. If Japan opened its 
agricultural market in TPP, this could also be advantageous for accelerating negotiations 
on the CJK FTA, as agricultural products are considered a difficult problem for the three 
states. However, the tension between China and Japan would make the CJK FTA difficult in 
the foreseeable future. Thus, Korea has to exert utmost effort for progress in the CJK FTA, 
at the same time leaving room to bypass it in favor of the reduced form of RCEP directly 
without the CJK FTA.
Step 3: Creation of a Reduced Form of the RCEP. RCEP is scheduled to conclude by the 
end of 2015; however, it will not be easy. Large countries may be reluctant to respect the 
central role of ASEAN. The flexibility clause could help break deadlocks, but could also 
curtail progress in achieving greater liberalization. In addition, varying internal policies of 
countries could prove to be difficult to harmonize and consolidate under RCEP. RCEP could 
still be put at risk because of tensions between its members, especially China and Japan. 
The South China Sea dispute involving China and several ASEAN countries also could 
reverberate in this manner.
In this situation, a more productive strategy is to see a streamlined trade agreement as one 
of the several steps that will be needed for an RCEP that embraces a more comprehensive 
program of regional economic integration and development. RCEP participants should not 
have to wait for a single trade liberalization by all participants and for agreement on all new 
rules before taking up the other opportunities for beneficial economic integration. RCEP can 
seek to achieve a significant initial down payment on trade liberalization and lock in progress 
towards ambitious end-point goals. The meaning of “reduced form” of RCEP can be either a 
reduced number of participants or a reduced context of market liberalization.
Korea needs to attempt to handpick the best features of existing Asian FTAs and use them 
as a basis for further negotiations for RCEP. Like early-harvest Bali packages in the Doha 
Round, a reduced form of RCEP can also be a useful interim solution for the final agreement. 
In this Asian track, Korea could play a balanced role among China, Japan, and ASEAN 
nations. Furthermore, based on the FTAs with China and the United States, it could assume 
a major role in linking RCEP with the U.S.-led TPP. These steps are not very different from 
a new roadmap for trade policy announced by the Park Geun-hye administration, which 
puts special emphasis on Korea’s linchpin role in regional economic integration in East Asia 
through a new FTA with China and the already signed agreement with the United States.
Endnotes
1. This article is revised from, “Korea’s Perspectives on the TPP,” which was presented at the 
Conference on the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Taiwan’s Future Development Strategy at 
Stanford University, October 11-12, 2013. I am grateful to John Dyck of ERS/USDA for 
valuable comments.
2. According to many estimates, Japan’s economy would be about 2.5 percent larger in 2015 with 
TPP than it would be without TPP.
3. In fact, China proposed the EAFTA (East Asia FTA), which is based on ASEAN+3, and 
actively promotes the integration of Asia on this basis, not paying much attention to ASEAN’s 
central position as the driver of Asian reorganization.
4. The tension between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, including the tension 
between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands would make the CJK difficult to 
achieve in any case.
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5. Recently Korea concluded bilateral FTA negotiations with Canada.
6. In this respect, other major developing countries, such as China, Brazil, and India, may have 
the same view as Korea.
7. Rice has been excluded in every previous FTA agreement that Korea concluded.
8. The lack of market opening in agricultural goods and pervasive NTBs in Japan was considered 
to be the reason for the Korea-Japan FTA negotiations’ breakdown. At the same time, 
Korea’s concerns with an increase in the trade deficit from trade with Japan and the fear of 
manufacturing competition, especially for small and medium sized enterprises, are other major 
reasons.
9. In past bilateral FTA talks, Japan requested the immediate elimination of Korean barriers to 
manufactured goods as well as some exceptions or other protective measures for Japanese 
agricultural goods.
10. Petri, Peter A., Michael G. Plummer, Fan Zhai. “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific 
Integration: A Quantitative Assessment,” Policy Analyses in International Economics 98 
(Washington: Peterson Institute for Economics, 2012).
11. The larger gains from RCEP reflect the opening of China, with which there is no preexisting 
FTA, and the benefits of eliminating the larger external barriers of many Asian countries.
12. The flexibility clauses said, “RCEP will include appropriate forms of flexibility including 
provision for special and differential treatment, plus additional flexibility to the least-developed 
ASEAN Member States.”
13. In this respect, RCEP member economies need to consider the expansion of RCEP to include 
other economies such as Taiwan.
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